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This year these awards take place at a crucial moment in the development of
our constitutional democracy. Such a democracy can flourish only where
there exists a basic, shared normative framework upon which the practice of
a constitution can be built. Expressed bluntly, where a community cannot
establish the most rudimentary of overlapping consensus as to basic values,
there can be no long-term future for a constitutional community. If we, as
the citizenry, cannot agree about a core meaning of freedom, equality,
dignity, democracy, accountability, transparency and integrity, then our
constitution will remain a text with no more significance than a document of
historical curiosity. John Rawls Political Liberalism (1993) understood this
requirement well: he sought not the creation of firm agreements on a
comprehensive conception of the good. Rather, he insisted that without
agreement on a core set of principles of justice, liberal democracy was not
possible.
To develop even this kind of limited consensus is never easy; how much
more so in a society that has experienced some three hundred years of racist
rule. For this reason the promotion of vibrant public discourse is critical to
the attainment of this form of consensus. And so we arrive at the role of the
press. Although our courts have appeared to eschew press exceptionalism —
the idea that the press has a preferred constitutional status — the Supreme
Court of Appeal has stated recently that press freedom is about the rights of
all citizens to a free flow of information, by which I take it that the press is the
conduit through which we, the citizens, can exchange views based upon the
free flow of information to all within society. (See Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a
E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 (5) SA 540 (SCA)
para 6.)
*Speech delivered at the Legal Journalist Awards on 7 November 2007.
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With this backdrop, I wish to concentrate on two related issues: the role of
the citizenry in the development of public discourse and the consequent role
of the press.
Recent controversies in the legal community have indicated that South
Africans may not even be able to agree on the meaning and implications of
freedom of expression. I make this seemingly provocative point in the
context of two new responses that have been developed to squeeze the very
life out of freedom of expression:
1. We may not criticize decisions of constitutionally established bodies —
presumably the courts, Chapter 9 institutions and the prosecution
authority — apart from the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), of
course. By now I hope you have realized the expedience of this claim,
for many who say the decisions of the JSC are to be obeyed uncritically
do not appear to carry that argument to the prosecution service as
enshrined in the Constitution, or for that matter to certain judgments!
2. Some issues are too divisive, so let us not debate them.
As to the first response, I accept readily that sitting judges cannot enter
into debates about the nature and validity of decisions taken by the JSC or
courts (save when sitting in court and having to deal with judgments of
other, mainly lower, courts). But this is not a principle that should apply to
any other member of society. Jeremy Bentham provided the complete
answer to this attempt at rendering public accountability meaningless when
he said that the duty of the citizen is ‘to obey punctually and censure freely’.
The recent controversy that has so racked the legal community illustrates
that in the view of some, no censure should be allowed. I read recently that
the output of these institutions must be respected uncritically as they are
what millions fought and thousands died for. What a trivialization of the
struggle against apartheid! Surely people did not sacrifice so much for the
construction of institutions, but rather for ideas to be implemented by those
institutions; ideas which, if followed, would ensure a narrowing of the gap
between the aspirations of the constitution and the degrading realities
encountered by millions of historically (and currently) disadvantaged South
Africans.
Turning to the question of divisive issues, the very point of freedom of
expression is to allow for differences of opinion, no matter how passionately
held. The Turkish Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Orhan Pamuk, said of
freedom of expression that ‘[t]hese freedoms, which modern people long for
as much as bread and water, should never be limited by using nationalist
sentiment, moral sensitivities or — worst of all — business or military
interests’ ((53) 9 The New York Review of Books 25 May 2006, translated by
Maureen Freely). I would add expedient populism to that list.
Of course, I understand the effect of apartheid upon the legal community.
Like so much else in our public and private lives, key legal institutions reflect
skewed power relationships in favour of a minority, so that in many of these
institutions debate followed by a vote may shut out the voices of those who
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reflect the views of a more permanent majority. But if we presume that we
will invariably hold to perspectives exclusively shaped by race, we cannot
have constitutional democracy; for we will never share anything of value.
Expression is about a conversation in which I open myself up to the reality
of another person into whose world I then enter. I begin to see things from
her perspective. We touch each other’s realities and exit the process
differently from how we entered it. If we fail to converse then, viewed
through this prism, no constitutional community is possible.
This is not to say that we have an absence of national conversation. There
are a few wonderful, brave and inspiring public intellectuals (and the list is
growing) who promote discourse. But within the legal community there
may, ironically, have been a larger group of such people under apartheid. In
the main, the public has neglected critical public discourse and with it has
made life more difficult for its conduit — the press. There is a further and
even more disturbing implication concerning the absence of a national
conversation. It is surely the right of each citizen to participate in the national
discourse. Under apartheid that right was denied to the majority purely on
grounds of race. The democratic constitution was designed to resolve this
part of the national question by guaranteeing to all full, substantive rights of
citizenship. But if, politically, the question of who is a South African remains
unresolved in post-apartheid society, the possible creation of hierarchies of
citizenship arises, and with it the denial to some of rights to be heard. In all
these ways the citizenry destroys the potential of free expression.
But that does not leave the press immune from independent scrutiny. The
role of the press is to promote that conversation, to interrogate its content, to
afford opportunity for examination of both the cant and the meaningful.
Without this engagement we cannot implement the idea of a constitution
because we will fail to attain the consensus, however basic, that is a necessary
condition for the kind of democracy promised in our text. We will disagree
about measures to promote equality and redress the hurt and damage of the
past, we will dispute the meaning of freedom of expression, disagree about
the most basic meaning of corruption, divide viciously about notions of
integrity and honesty.
There must exist independent obligations upon the press to inform,
educate and analyze. In my view, the press report card should be marked as
‘Pass, but with much room for improvement’. Let me say that law reportage
has improved in quality and quantity and in many instances has acutely
framed the debate around key cases — S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC), President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football
Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign
(No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) being instances of this.
Regrettably I must add, however, that all too often reportage of key cases
is superficial and lacking in any context. I sometimes wonder whether much,
if any, use is made of the very clear press statements issued by the
Constitutional Court when judgments are handed down. In some instances
the reports of cases sound like cheerleading for one party. Others claim to
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provide guidance to the legal strategies employed by counsel or the core
implications of a judgment, whereas all they succeed in doing is confirming
the legal ignorance of the reporter. We have no Linda Greenhouse of the
New York Times, who provides consistently superb analytical guidance to lay
audiences on the work of the US Supreme Court.
Public education about our constitutional system remains very patchy; and
public awareness is affected thereby. In this connection the role of the public
broadcaster is in need of intense interrogation. Public discourse about key
issues needs to be promoted in and by the public broadcaster, although the
rest of the media are not immune from obligation. Certainly, the owners of
the press have some duty to ensure that journalists possess the resources to
respond to these challenges, and editors owe it to the public discourse to
promote informed debates about key cases and legal developments.
Let me cite two illustrations of failure by the press in its coverage beyond
the reporting of recent cases. First, the Constitution is blamed for increasing
crime as if it is the Constitution that promotes the kind of violence which,
like a cancer, threatens the body of our society. Secondly, debates about the
transformation of our legal system (on the rare occasion that any publication
appears) tend to focus exclusively on demographic representation of the
profession or the infusion of vernacular law into the legal mainstream. These
are issues of major importance and I, for one, consider them to be of
significance to the future of our legal system. But they are not mere
jurisprudential war-cries: they are elements of a key debate about what legal
system is possible in South Africa, given our history and our place in Africa
and the global world. To call for vernacular law to have a greater role in the
overall legal system is too important a topic to be left to populist platitudes.
Even more so, the national debate must be about how law in this country can
help produce a society based on ubuntu; how it can promote the dignity of
every member of that community and supply him or her with the substantive
elements necessary to exercise citizenship meaningfully.
In the setting and promotion of all of this conversation, the press must play
a cardinal role.
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